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Over the years, mathematics and statistics have become increasingly impor-
tant in the social sciences1. A look at the history quickly confirms this claim.
At the beginning of the 20th century most theories in the social sciences were
formulated in qualitative terms while quantitative methods did not play a sub-
stantial role in the formulation and establishment of them. Moreover, many
practitioners considered mathematical methods to be inappropriate and sim-
ply not suited to foster our understanding of the social domain. Notably, the
famous Methodenstreit was also about the role of mathematics in the social
sciences. Here mathematics was considered to be the method of the natural
sciences from which the social sciences had to be separated during the period
of maturation of these disciplines. All this changed by the end of the century.
By then, mathematical and especially statistical methods were standardly used
and it became relatively uncontested that they are of much value in the social
sciences. In fact, the use of mathematical and statistical methods is now ubiqui-
tous: Almost all social sciences rely on statistical methods to analyze data and
to form hypotheses, and almost all of them use (to a greater or lesser extend) a
range of mathematical methods to help us understand the social world.
Additional indication for the increasing importance of mathematical and
statistical methods in the social sciences is the formation of new sub-disciplines,
and the establishment of specialized journals and societies. And indeed,
sub-disciplines such as Mathematical Psychology and Mathematical Sociology
emerged, and corresponding journals such as The Journal of Mathematical Psy-
chology (since 1964), The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (since 1976), Math-
ematical Social Sciences (since 1980) as well as the online journals Journal of
Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (since 1998) and Mathematical An-
thropology and Cultural Theory (since 2000) were established. What is more,
societies, such such as the Society for Mathematical Psychology (since 1976) and
the Mathematical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association
(since 1996) were founded. Similar developments happened in other countries.
The mathematization of economics set in somewhat earlier (Vazquez 1995;
Weintraub 2002). However, the use of mathematical methods in economics
started booming only in the second half of the last century (Debreu 1991). Con-
temporary economics is dominated by the mathematical approach, although a
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certain style of doing economics becomes more and more under attack in the last
decade or so. Recent developments in behavioral economics and experimental
economics can also be understood as a reaction against the dominance (and
limitations) of an overly mathematical approach to economics. There are simi-
lar debates in other social sciences, but it is important to stress that problems
of one method (such as axiomatization or the use of set theory) can hardly be
taken as a sign of bankruptcy of mathematical methods in the social sciences
tout court.
This chapter surveys mathematical and statistical methods used in the social
sciences and discusses some of their philosophical questions. It is divided into
two parts. Sections 1 to 3 are devoted to mathematical methods, and Sections
4 to 8 to statistical methods.
1 A Plurality of Mathematical Methods
Social scientists use a wide variety of mathematical methods. Given that the
space of this chapter is restricted, it is impossible to list them all, give examples,
examine their domain of applicability, and to discuss some of the philosophical
problems they raise. Instead, we broadly distinguish between three different
kinds of methods: (i) methods imported from the formal sciences, (ii) methods
imported from the natural sciences, and (iii) sui generis social scientific methods.
We review them in turn.
Methods imported from the formal sciences include (linear) alge-
bra, calculus (including differential equations), the axiomatic method, logic and
set theory, probability theory (including Markov chains), linear programming,
topology, graph theory, and complexity theory. All these methods have impor-
tant applications in the social sciences.2 In recent years, various methods from
computer science have been incorporated into social science research as well.
There is also a strong trend within computer science to address problems from
the social sciences. An example is the recent establishment of the new inter-
disciplinary field Computational Social Choice which is dominated by computer
scientists.3
Interesting, though, much work in Computational Social Choice uses ana-
lytical and logical methods. There is, however, also a strong trend in the social
sciences to use powerful numerical and simulation methods to explore complex
an (typically) dynamical social phenomena. The reason for this is of course the
availability of high-powered computers. But not all social scientists follow this
trend. Especially many economists are reluctant to use simulation methods and
do not consider them to be appropriate tools to study economic systems.4
Methods imported from the natural sciences become more and more
popular in the social sciences. These methods are more specific than the formal
methods mentioned above; they involve substantial assumptions that happen –
or so it is claimed – to be fulfilled in the social domain. These methods comprise
tools to study multi-agent systems, the theory of complex systems, non-linear
2For a lucid exposition of many of these methods and examples from the social sciecnes,
see Luce and Suppes (1968).
3See http://www.illc.uva.nl/COMSOC/
4For a discussion of computer simulations in the social sciences, see Hegselmann et al.
(1996). In this context it is interesting to study the influence of the work done at the Santa Fe
Institute on mainstream economics. See e.g. Anderson et al (1988). See also Waldrop (1992).
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dynamics, and the methods developed in synergetics (Weidlich 2006) and, more
recently, in econophysics (Mantegna and Stanley 1999). The applicability of
these methods follows from the observation that societies are nothing but many-
body systems (like a gas is a many-body system composed of molecules) that
exhibit certain features (such as the emergence of ordering phenomena). Hence,
these features can be accounted for in terms of a statistical description, just like
gases and other many-body systems which are studied in the natural sciences.
Such methods are also used in new interdisciplinary fields such as environmental
economics.
Besides providing various methods that can be used to study social phenom-
ena, the natural sciences also inspired a certain way of addressing a problem.
Meanwhile it is common to say that the core activity in the social sciences is
model building.5 These models are carefully crafted, idealizations have to be
made, and the consequences of the model are often obtained with the help of
a computer simulation. This is much like in physics. Let us therefore call this
approach the physicist’s approach to social science and contrast it with the
mathematician’s approach to social science outlined above.
Finally, there are mathematical methods that emerged from prob-
lems in the social sciences. These include powerful instruments such as
decision theory6, utility theory, game theory7, measurement theory (Krantz et
al. 1971), social choice theory (Gaertner 2006), and Judgment Aggregation
(List and Puppe 2009). The latter theories were invented by social scientists,
for social scientists and with a specific social-science application in mind. They
help addressing specific problems that arise in the context of the social sciences
that did not have an analogue in the natural sciences when they were invented.
Only later, some of these theories also turned out to be useful in the natural
sciences or have been combined with insights from the natural sciences. Evo-
lutionary game theory is a case in point.8 Other interesting examples are the
study quantum games (Piotrowski and Sladkowski 2003) and the application of
decision theory in fundamental physics (Wallace 2010).
Interestingly, there are also methods that cannot be attached to one specific
science. Network theory is a case in point. As networks are studied in almost all
sciences, parallel developments took place, and much can be learned by exploring
what’s been obtained in other fields (Jackson 2008).9
Having listed a large number of methods, the question arrises which method
is appropriate for a certain problem. This question can only be answered on a
case by case basis and it is part of the ingenuity of the scientist to pick the best
method. But let us stress the following: While some scientists ask themselves
which problems they can address with their favorite method, the starting point
should always be a specific problem. And once a problem is chosen, the scientist
picks the best method that helps solving it. To have some choice, it is important
that scientists are acquainted with as many methods as possible. Mathematics
(and related disciplines) provide the scientist with a toolbox out of which they
5For a more detailed discussion of modeling in the social sciences, see ch. 29 (“Local
models versus global theories, and their assessment”) of this handbook. For a general review
of models in science, see Frigg and Hartmann (2007).
6See ch. 15 (“Rational choice and its alternatives”) of this handbook.
7See ch. 16 (“Game theory”) of this handbook.
8See ch. 17 (“Evolutionary approaches”) of this handbook.
9See also ch. 18 (“Networks”) of this handbook.
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have to pick a tool. Let us call this the Toolbox View.
2 Why Mathematizing the Social Sciences?
A historically important reason for the mathematization of the social sciences
was that ‘mathematics’ is associated with precision and objectivity. These are
(arguably) two requirements any science should satisfy, and so the mathema-
tization of the social sciences was considered to be a crucial step that had to
be taken to turn the social sciences into real science. Some such view has been
defended by many authors. Luce and Suppes (1968), for example, argue along
these lines for the importance of axiomatizing the theories of the social sciences.
These authors also developed measurement theory (Krantz et al. 1971) and
Suppes (1967, 2001) showed how the relation between a theory and its target
system can be explicated in mathematical terms. Contrary to this tradition, it
has been argued that the subject matter of the social sciences does not require
a high level of precision and that the social sciences are and should rather be
inexact (cf. Hausman 1992). After all, what works in the natural sciences may
well not work in the social sciences.
While Sir Karl Popper, one of the towering figures in the methodology of
social science, did not promote the mathematization of the social sciences in
the first place (Hands 2008), it is clear that it nevertheless plays an enormous
role in his philosophy. Given his focus on predictions and falsifiability, a theory
that is mathematized is preferable to a theory that is not. After all, it is much
easier to derive falsifiable conclusions from clearly stated propositions than from
vague and informal claims.
It is a mistake, however, to overestimate the role of the mathematics. At
the end, mathematics provides the social scientist only with tools, and what one
obtains when using these tools will crucially depend on the assumptions that
are made. This is a variant of the well known GIGO principle from computer
science (“garbage in, garbage out). All assumptions are motivated informally;
formulating them in the language of mathematics just helps putting them more
precisely. And once the assumptions are formulated mathematically, the ma-
chinery of mathematics helps to draw inferences in an automated way. This
holds for analytical calculations as well as for numerical studies, including com-
puter simulations (Frigg and Reiss 2010; Hartmann 1996).
This brings us to another advantage of mathematical methods in the social
sciences. While non-formal theories often remain rather simplistic and highly
idealized, formal theories can be complicated and (more) realistic, reflecting the
messiness of our world. The mathematical machinery then helps drawing in-
ferences which could not be obtained without them (Humphreys 2004). Often
different assumptions pull in opposite directions, and it is not clear which one
will be stronger in a specific situation. However, when implemented in a math-
ematical model, it can be derived what happens in which part of the parameter
space. And so the availability of powerful computers allows the systematic study
of more realistic models.
There is, however, also a danger associated with this apparent advantage.
Given the availability of powerful computers, scientists may be tempted to con-
struct very complex models. But while these models may do well in terms of
empirical adequacy, it is not so clear that they also provide understanding. This
4
is often provided by rather simple models (sometimes called ‘toy models‘), i.e.
models that pick only one crucial aspect of a system and help us to get a feel
for what follows from it.10
There are several other reasons for the mathematization in the social sci-
ences. We list them in turn.
1. Theory Representation. Mathematics is used to formulate a theory.
By doing so, the structure of the theory becomes transparent and the
relationships that hold between the variables can be determined. Math-
ematics provides clarity, generality, and rigor. There are many ways to
represent a theory. For long, philosophers have championed the syntactic
view (basically a representation of the theory in first order logic) or the
semantic view in its various forms (Balzer et al 1987; Suppes 2000). While
these reconstructions may be helpful for coming up with a consistent ver-
sion of a theory, it apparently suffices for all practical purposes to state a
set of equations that constitute the mathematical part of the theory.
2. Theory Exploration. Once the theory is represented in mathematical
terms, the mathematical machinery can be employed to derive qualitative
and quantitative consequences of the theory. This helps to better under-
stand what the theory is all about and what it entails about the world.
The deductive consequences of the theory (and additional assumptions
that have to be made) can be divided into retrodictions or predictions.
For retrodictions the question arises which additional assumptions have
to be made to obtain a certain (already measured) value of a variable.
3. Theory Testing. The predictions of a mathematically formulated theory
can then be used to test the theory by confronting its consequences with
relevant data. At the end, the theory will be confirmed or disconfirmed,
or to put in Popperian terms, corroborated or falsified.
4. Heuristics. Once the structure of a theory is formulated in mathemat-
ical term, a look at it may reveal analogies to other phenomena. This
may inspire additional investigations (“intuition pump”) and lead to a
better understanding of the class of phenomena under investigation. Also,
a numerical study of a theory may suggest new patterns that can be incor-
porated into the assumptions of another theory. A good example of this
point is the use of cellular automata for studying the emergence of order-
ing phenomena, such as in Schelling’s famous Segregation Model (Sugden
2008).
5. Explanation and Understanding: While it is controversial what a
scientific explanation is, it is clear that – once the theory is formulated
mathematically – a phenomenon can be fitting into a larger theoretical
pattern (as the unification account demands) or a causal story can be
read off from the theory.
10For more doubts about some of the uses of simulations in the social sciences, see
Humphreys (2004).
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3 Methodological Issues
There are interesting parallels between the use of mathematics in the natural
and social sciences. In both kinds of sciences, we find a plurality of methods
ranging from axiomatic methods to the use of computer simulations. We also
find very different types of models, ranging from toy models (that illuminate one
feature of a system in a simple way without scoring high in terms of empirical
adequacy) to models that fit a large amount of data (but do not provide much
understanding). The mathematization also has similar purposes in both kinds
of sciences: it helps to represent a certain object or system, to explain it and to
make predictions to test the underlying theory or model.
However, there is also an interesting difference. This difference has to do
with the relation between the mathematical formalism and the data in the nat-
ural and social sciences. Let us assume that we have constructed a mathematical
model and we confront it with data. If the data correspond to what the model
predicts, the model is confirmed. If the data contradict the model’s prediction,
then there are two options in the natural sciences: either there was a measure-
ment error, or (or an error can be excluded) the model has a problem. These
two possibilities also show up in many social-science contexts. However, there
is a third option in the social sciences which has to do with the observation that
the data in the social sciences are often not very hard.
Let us give an example from cognitive psychology. In a series of experiments,
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) showed that the participants commit fallacies
such as the conjunction fallacy. In that case, 85% of the participants judge the
conjunction of two propositions to be more probable than on the the conjuncts.
One option to argue is that these people are irrational as they violate a basic
rules of probability. However, things are not that easy. In the sequel, many other
experiments were conducted and proposals were made as to how people reason
in such cases. What results is an intricate interplay between mathematical
modeling and experimentation which does not occur in this form in the natural
sciences (Hertwig et al 2008; Hartmann and Meijs 2010).
The softness of the data is probably also one of the reasons why there is
much more debate in the social sciences about the usefulness of mathematical
methods. The social sciences exhibit a wealth of of different approaches, and
mathematical methods play a more or less important role in them. The de-
fenders of mathematical methods will argue that mathematics simply provides
a host of structures, and as the social world is structured just like the natural
world is, some of these structures will fit (or approximately fit). Opponents will
either doubt that there are stable structures to be found in the social world,
or they will argue that the structures that mathematics (and related sciences)
provide do not fit as the social world is very different from the natural world.
We take this to be an empirical question and do not see a reason why one should
not examine go ahead and employ mathematics in the social sciences.
Besides the general debate about the usefulness of mathematical methods
in the social sciences, there is also a lot of debate about the question which
methods are most appropriate. An example is the debate about econophysics.
The practitioners of this field (mostly physicists or social scientists with a back-
ground in physics) approach certain problems from economics with the tools
of statistical physics. Typical results are the explanation of certain power laws
that show up in economical data. But while concepts and ideas from physics
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have played an important role in economics in the past11, many economists
do not consider the explanations given by econophysicists as appropriate, cf.
Gallegatti (2006).
The above mentioned example from cognitive psychology suggests, however,
that the standards for the assessment of mathematical approaches to the social
sciences are much less clear than in the natural sciences. One may reasonably
doubt the use of mathematical models altogether, and one may also doubt the
application of a specific method. Much more needs to be done here until a
consensus (if there will ever be one) is reached.
4 The Development of Statistical Reasoning
Statistical reasoning is nowadays a central method of the social sciences. First,
it is indispensable for evaluating experimental data e.g. in behavioral economics
or experimental psychology. For instance, psychologists might want to find out
whether men act, in a certain situation, differently from women, or whether
there are causal relationships between violent video games and aggressive be-
havior. Second, the social sciences heavily use statistical models as a modeling
tool for analyzing empirical data and predicting future events, especially in
econometrics and operational research, but recently, also in the mathematical
branches of psychology, sociology, and the like. For example, time series and
regression models relate a number of input (potential predictor) variables to
output (predicted) variables. Sophisticated model comparison procedures try
to elicit the structure of the data-generating process, eliminate some variables
from the model, select a “best model” and finally fit the parameter values to
the data.
Still, the conception of statistics as an inferential tool is quite young:
throughout the 19th century, statistics was mainly used as a descriptive tool
to summarize data and to fit models. While in inferential statistics, the focus
lies on testing scientific hypotheses against each other, or quantifying evidence
for or against a certain hypothesis, descriptive statistics focuses on summarizing
data and fitting the parameters of a given model to a set of data. The most
famous example is maybe Gauß’ method of the least squares, a procedure to
center a data set (xn, yn)n∈N around a straight line. Other important descrip-
tive statistics are contingency tables, effect sizes, and tendency and dispersion
measures.
Descriptive statistics were, however, “statistics without probability” (Mor-
gan 1987), or as one might also say, statistics without uncertainty. In the
late 19th and early 20th century, science was believed to be concerned with
certainty, with the discovery of invariable, universal laws. This left no place
for uncertain reasoning. Recall that at that time, stochastic theories in the
natural sciences, such as statistical mechanics, quantum physics, or laws of in-
heritance, were still quite new or not yet invented. Furthermore, there was
a hope of reducing them to more fundamental, deterministic regularities, e.g.
to take the stochastic nature of statistical mechanics as an expression of our
imperfect knowledge, our uncertainty, and not as the fundamental regularities
that govern the motion of molecules. Thus, statistical modeling contradicted
11Examples are the work of the Physiocrats and the introduction of the concept of equilib-
rium, see Mirrowki (1889).
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the nomothetic ideal (Gigerenzer 1987), inspired by Newtonian and Laplacean
physics, of establishing universal laws. Therefore statistics was considered as
a mere auxiliary, imperfect device, a mere surrogate for proof by deduction or
experiment. For instance, the famous analysis of variance (ANOVA) obtained
its justification in the nomothetic view through its role in causal inference and
elucidating causal laws.
It is interesting to note that these views were held even in the social sciences,
although the latter dealt with a reality that was usually too complex to isolate
causal factors in laboratory experiments. Controlling for external impacts and
confounders poses special problems to the social sciences, whose domain are
humans and not inanimate objects. The search for deterministic, universal laws
in the social sciences might thus seem futile – and this is probably the received
view today –, but in the first half of the 20th century many social scientists
thought differently. Statistics was needed to account for measurement errors
and omitted causal influences in a model, but it was thought to play a merely
provisional role:
“statistical devices are to be valued according to their efficacy in
enabling us to lay bare the true relationship between the phenomena
under consideration. An ideal method would eliminate all of the
disturbing factors.” (Schultz 1928, 33)
Thus, the view of statistics was eliminativist : as soon as it has done the job
and elucidated the laws which we aim at, we can dismiss it. In other words,
the research project consisted in eliminating probabilistic elements, instead of
discovering statistical laws and regularities or modeling physical quantities as
probabilistic variables with a certain distribution. This methodological pre-
sumption, taken from 19th century physics, continued to haunt social sciences
far into the first half of the 20th century. Economics, as the “physics of social
sciences”, was particularly affected by that conception (Morgan 2002).
In total, there are three main reasons why inferential statistics was recog-
nized as a central method of the social sciences:
1. The advances in mathematical probability, as summarized in the seminal
work of Kolmogorov (1933/56).
2. The inferential character of many scientific questions, e.g. whether there
is a causal relationship between variables X and Y . There was a need for
techniques of data analysis that ended up with an inference or a decision,
rather than with a description of a correlation.
3. The groundbreaking works by particular pioneer minds, such as Tinbergen
and Haavelmo in economics (Morgan 1987).
The following sections investigate the different ways inferential statistics has
been spelled out, with a focus on the school that is most prominent in modern
social science: Fisher’s method of significance testing.
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5 Significance Tests and Statistical Decision
Rules
One of the great conceptual inventions of the founding fathers of inferential
statistics was the sampling distribution (e.g. Fisher 1935). In the traditional
approach (e.g. in classical regression), there was no need for the concept of a
sample drawn from a larger population – instead, the modeling process directly
linked the observed data to a probabilistic model. In the modern understanding,
the actual data are just a sample drawn out of a much larger, hypothetical pop-
ulation about which we want to make an inference. The rationale for this view
of data consists in the idea that scientific results need to be replicable. There-
fore, we have to make an inference about the comprehensive population (or the
data-generating process, for that matter) instead of making an ‘in-sample’ in-
ference whose validity is restricted to the particular data we observed. This idea
of a sampling distribution proved crucial for what is known today as frequentist
statistics. That approach strongly relies about this idea of the sampling distri-
bution, outlined in the seminal works of Fisher (1925, 1935, 1956) and Neyman
and Pearson (1933, 1967), parting ways with the classical accounts of Bayes,
Laplace, Venn and others.
In frequentist statistics, there is a sharp division between approaches that
focus on inductive behavior, such as the Neyman-Pearson school, and those
that focus on inductive inference, such as Fisherian statistics. To elucidate
the difference, we will present both approaches in a nutshell. Neyman and
Pearson (1933) developed a behavioral framework for deciding between two
competing hypotheses. For instance, take the hypothesis H0 that a certain
learning device does not improve the students’ performance, and compare it
to the hypothesis H1 that there is such an effect. The outcome of the test
is interpreted as a judgment on the hypothesis, or the prescription to take a
certain action (“accept/reject H0”). They contrast two hypotheses H0 and H1
and develop testing procedures such that the probability of erroneously rejecting
H0 in favor of H1 is bounded at a certain level α, and that the probability of
erroneously rejecting H1 in favor of H0 is, given that constraint, as low as
possible. In other words, Neyman and Pearson aim at maximizing power of
a test (the chance of a correct decision for H1) under the condition that the
level of the test (the chance of an incorrect decision for H1) is bounded at a
real number α. Thus, they developed a more or less symmetric framework for
making a decision between competing hypothesis, with the aim of minimizing
the chance of a wrong decision.
While such testing procedures apply well to issues of quality control in indus-
trial manufacturing and the like, the famous biologist and statistician Ronald
A. Fisher (1935, 1956) argued that they are not suitable for the use in science.
First, a proper behavioristic, or decision-theoretic approach has to determine
costs for faulty decisions (and Neyman-Pearson do this implicitly, by choosing
the level α of a test). This involves, however, reference to the purposes to which
we want to put our newly acquired knowledge. For Fisher, this is not compatible
with the idea of science as pursuit of truth. Statistical inference has to be “con-
vincing to all freely reasoning minds, entirely independently of any intentions
that might be furthered by utilizing the knowledge inferred” (Fisher 1956, 103).
Second, in science, a judgment on the truth of a hypothesis is usually not made
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on the basis of a single experiment. Instead, we obtain some provisional result
which is refined through further analysis. By their behavioral rationale and by
making a “decision” between two hypotheses, Neyman and Pearson insinuate
that the actual data justify a judgment on whether H0 or H1 is true. Such
judgments have, according to Fisher, to be suspended until further experiments
confirm the hypothesis, ideally using varying auxiliary assumptions and experi-
mental designs. Third, Neyman and Pearson test a statistical hypothesis against
a definite alternative. This leads to some results that appear paradoxical. Take,
for instance, the example of a normal distribution with known variance σ2 = 1
where the hypothesis about the mean H0 : µ = 0 is tested against the hypothesis
H1 : µ = 1. If the average of the observations centers, say, around -5, it appears
that neither H0 or H1 should be ‘accepted’. Nevertheless, the Neyman-Pearson
rationale contends that in such a situation we have to accept H0 because the
discrepancy to the actual data is less striking than with H1. In such a situation,
when H0 offers a poor fit to the data, such a decision is arguably weird.
Summing up, Fisher disqualifies Neyman and Pearson’s decision-theoretic
approach as a mathematical “reinterpretation” of his own significant tests that
is utterly inappropriate for use in the sciences – he even suspects that Neyman
and Pearson would not have come up with their approach had they had “any
real familiarity with work in the natural sciences” (Fisher 1956, 76). Therefore
he developed a methodology of his own which proved to be extremely influential
in the natural as well as in the social sciences. His first two books, “Statistical
Methods for Research Workers” (1925) and “The Design of Experiments” (1935)
quickly went through many reprints and shaped the applications of statistics in
the sciences for decades. The core of his method is the test of a point null
hypothesis or significance test. Here, we want to tell chance effects from real
effects. To this end, we check whether a null (default, chance) hypothesis is
good enough to fit the data. For instance, we want to test the effects of a
new learning device on students’ performance, and we start with the default
assumption that the new device yields no improvement. If that hypothesis
is apparently incompatible with the data (if the results are ‘significant’), we
conclude that there is some effect in the treatment. The core of the argument
consists in ‘Fisher’s Disjunction’ :
“Either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred, or the theory
[=the null hypothesis] is not true.”(Fisher 1956, 39)
In other words, the occurrence of a result that is very unlikely to be a product
of mere chance (students using the device scoring much better than the rest)
strongly speaks against the null hypothesis that there is no effect. Significant
findings under the null suggest that there is more than pure chance involved,
that there is some kind of systematic effect going on. As we will see below, this
disjunction should be regarded with great caution, and it has been the source
of many confusions and misunderstandings.
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between Neyman-Pearsonian and Fishe-
rian tests for the case of testing hypotheses on the mean value of a Normal
distribution. The probability
p := PH0(T (X) > T (x0)) (1)
gives the level of significance which the observed value x0 achieves under H0,
with respect to a function T that measures distance from the null hypothesis
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Figure 1: Left figure: The null hypothesis H0 : N(0, 1) (full line) is tested at
the 5%-level against against the alternative H0 : N(1, 1) (dashed line). Right
figure: a Fisherian significance test of H0 against an unspecified alternative. –
The shaded areas represents the set of results where H0 is rejected in favor of
H1, respectively where the results speak “significantly” against H0.
H0. p is also often called the p-value induced by x0, and is supposed to give a
rough idea of the tenability of the null. The higher the discrepancy, the more
significant the results.
The rationale underlying Fisher’s Disjunction displays striking similarity to
Karl Popper’s falsificationist philosophy of science: A hypothesis H0, which
should be as precise and free of ambiguity as possible, is tested by checking its
observational implications. If our observations contradict H0, we reject it and
replace it by another hypothesis. However, this understanding of falsificationism
only applies to testing deterministic hypotheses. Observations are never incom-
patible with probabilistic hypotheses, they are just very unlikely. Therefore
Popper (1959, 191) expanded the falsificationist rationale by saying that we re-
gard a hypothesis H0 as false when the observed results are improbable enough.
This is exactly the rationale of Fisher’s Disjunction. Notably, Fisher formulated
these ideas as early as Popper and independently of him. The methodological
similarity between Popper and Fisher’s views becomes even more evident in the
following quote:
“[...] it should be noted that the null hypothesis is never proved or
established, but is possibly disproved, in the course of experimenta-
tion. Every experiment may be said to exist only in order to give
the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis.” (Fisher 1935,
19)
This denial of positive confirmation of the null by non-significant results fits not
only well with Popper’s view on confirmation and corroboration, but also with
a more modern textbook citation:
“Although a significant departure [from the null] provides some de-
gree of evidence against a null hypothesis, it is important to realize
that a ‘nonsignificant’ departure does not provide positive evidence
in favor of that hypothesis. The situation is rather that we have
failed to find strong evidence against the null hypothesis.” (Ar-
mitage and Berry 1987, 96)
Thus, the symmetry of the Neyman-Pearsonian approach is broken: While
Neyman-Pearson tests end up “accepting” either hypothesis (and building action
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on the basis of this decision), Fisherian significance tests understand a signifi-
cant result as strong evidence against the null hypothesis, but an insignificant
result does not mean evidence for the null.
The attentive reader might have noticed that Fisher’s Disjunction is actually
inconsistent with his own criticism of the Neyman-Pearson appraoch. Recall
that Fisher argued that significant outcomes do not deliver final verdicts on
the feasibility of the null hypothesis. Rather, they state provisional evidence
against the null. But how is this compatible with the idea of “disproving the
null” by means of significance tests? To reconcile both positions, Fisher has to
admit some abuse of language:
“[...] if we use the term rejection for our attitude to such a [null]
hypothesis, it should be clearly understood that no irreversible de-
cision has been taken; that as rational beings, we are prepared to be
convinced by future evidence that [...] in fact a very remarkable and
exceptional coincidence had taken place.” (Fisher 1959, 35)
In the light of these ambiguities, it does not surprise that Fisher’s writings
have been the source of many misunderstandings, and that scientists sometimes
use fallacious practices or interpretations while believing that these practices
have been authorized by a great statistician. Before describing the problems of
significance tests, however, I would like to shed light on the contrast between
frequentist statistics, which comprises Fisher’s approach as well as the Neyman-
Pearson paradigm, and the rivalling school of Bayesian statistics.
6 Fisher versus Bayes
Bayesian inference is a school of statistics with great significance for some theo-
retical branches of the social sciences, such as decision theory, game theory and
the psychology of human reasoning. The principles of Bayesian inference are
explained in the chapter on decision theory, so we restrict ourselves to a brief
outline of the basic idea. Suffice to say that Bayesian statistics is, essentially,
a theory of belief revision: prior beliefs on the credibility of a hypothesis H
are represented by mathematical probabilities, modified in the light of incoming
evidence E and transformed into posterior beliefs (represented by a conditional
probability, P (H|E)). The relevant formula that expresses how these beliefs are
changed is Bayes’s Theorem:
P (H|E) = P (H)P (E|H)
P (E)
=
P (H)P (E|H)
P (E|H)P (H) + P (E|¬H)P (¬H)
=
(
1 +
1− P (H)
P (H)
P (E|¬H)
P (E|H)
)−1
.
Thus, the sampling distributions of E under H and ¬H are combined with
the prior probability of H in order to arrive at a comprehensive verdict on the
credibility of H in the light of evidence E.
Modern philosophers of statistics – but also scientists themselves – have
stressed the contrast between frequentist and Bayesian inference, depicting them
as mutually exclusive schools of statistics (Howson and Urbach 2006; Mayo
1996). The polemics which both Bayesians and frequentists use to mock at
12
their respective opponents adds to the image of statistics as a deeply divided
discipline where two enemy camps are quarreling about the right foundations of
inductive inference. In particular, Bayesians have been eager to point out the
limitations and shortcomings of frequentist inference for scientific applications,
such as in the seminal paper of Edwards, Lindman and Savage (1963). Notably,
this influential methodological contribution appeared not in a statistics jour-
nal, but in Psychological Review ! On the other hand, frequentist criticisms of
Bayesian inference read equally harshly.
These heated debates do not do justice to the intentions of the founding
fathers, who are often more pragmatic than one might be inclined to think in
retrospect. Take the case of Ronald A. Fisher. Although Fisher is correctly
perceived as one of the founding fathers of frequentist inference, it is wrong to
see him as an anti-Bayesian. True, Fisher objects to the use of prior proba-
bilities in scientific inference. But it is important to see why and under which
circumstances. In principle, he says, there is nothing wrong with using Bayes’
formula to revise one’s belief, it is just practically impossible to base a sound
scientific judgment on them. For how shall we defend a specific assignment of
prior beliefs vis-a`-vis our fellow scientists if they are nothing more than psy-
chological tendencies? Most often, there is no knowledge available on which we
could base specific prior beliefs (1935, 6-7; 1956, 17). That said, Fisher speaks
very respectfully about Bayes and his framework: Bayesian inference may be
appropriate in science if genuine prior knowledge is available (1935, 13), and he
admits the rationality of the subjective probability interpretation in spite of his
own inclination to view probabilities as relative frequencies.
It is therefore important to note that the debate between frequentist (here:
Fisherian) and Bayesian statistics is not in the first place a debate about the
principles of inductive inference in general, but a debate about which kind of
inference is more appropriate for the purposes of science. The following sec-
tion will cast some doubts on the appropriateness of pure, unaided significance
testing in the social sciences.
7 The Pitfalls of Significance Testing
The practice of significance tests has been dominating experiments in the so-
cial sciences for more than half a century. Journal editors and referees ask for
significance tests and p-values (quantities describing the level of significance),
standardizing experimental reports in a wide variety of branches of science
(econometrics, experimental psychology, behavioral economics, etc.). Alterna-
tive approaches, e.g. the application of Bayesian or likelihoodist statistics to
the evaluation of an experiment, had few chances of being published.
These publication practices in the last decades are at odds with the existence
of a long methodological debate on significance testing in the social sciences (e.g.
Rozeboom 1960). In that debate, statisticians and social scientists – mostly
mathematically educated psychologists – have repeatedly criticized the misuse
of significance tests in evaluating and interpreting scientific experiments. Before
going into the details of that debate, we briefly list some apparent advantages
of significance testing.
Objectivity Significance tests avoid the subjective probabilities of Bayesian
statistics. Thereby the observed levels of significance seem to be an objec-
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tive standard for evaluating the experiment, e.g. for telling a chance effect
from a real one.
No Alternative Hypotheses Significance tests are a means of testing a sin-
gle, exact hypothesis, without specifying a certain direction of departure
(i.e. an alternative hypothesis). Therefore, significance tests detect more
kinds of deviation from that hypothesis than Neyman-Pearson tests do.
Replicability Significance tests address the issue of replicability – namely the
significance level can be understood as the relative frequency of observing
a more extreme result if (i) the null hypothesis were true and (ii) the trial
were repeated very often.
Practicality Significance tests are easy to implement, and significance levels
are easy to compute.
However, it is not clear whether these advantages of significance tests are really
convincing. We discuss a couple of objections.
Fisher’s Disjunction revisited. The original example which Fisher used
to motivate his famous disjunction was the hypothesis that the stars are evenly
distributed in the sky, i.e. the chance that a star is in a particular area of the
sky is proportional to the size of that area. Thus, if there are a lot of stars
next to a particular star, such an event is unlikely to happen due to chance.
Indeed, clusters of stars are frequently observed. We may, according to Fisher’s
Disjunction, rule out the hypothesis of uniform distributions and conclude that
stars tend to cluster.
However, Hacking (1965, 81-82) has convincingly argued that such an ap-
plication of Fisher’s Disjunction is fallacious. Under the hypothesis of uniform
distribution, every constellation of stars is extremely unlikely, and there are no
likely vs. unlikely chances, but only ‘exceptionally rare chances’. If Fisher’s
Disjunction were correct, we would thus always have to reject the hypothesis
of uniform distribution, independent of the outcome. This amounts to a re-
ductio of significance testing since clearly, hypotheses that postulate a uniform
distribution are testable, and they often occur in scientific practice.
To circumvent Hacking’s objection, we might interpret Fisher’s Disjunction
in a different way. For instance, we could read the ‘exceptionally rare chance’
as a chance that is exceptionally rare compared to other possible events, instead
of ‘a probability lower than a fixed value p’. Still, this does not help us in
the present problem because the uniform distribution postulates that all star
constellations are equally likely or unlikely. Thus, the notion of a relatively rare
chance ceases to apply (Royall 1997, 65-68).
One might concede Hacking’s objection for this special case and try to rescue
significance tests in general by introducing a parameter of interest ϑ. This is
a standard situation in statistical practice. For instance, let’s take a coin flip
model which has “heads” and “tails” as possible outcomes, and ϑ denotes the
propensity of the coin to come up heads. Under the null hypothesis H0 : ϑ = 0.5,
all sequences of heads and tails are equally likely, but still, it is ostensibly mean-
ingful to say that ‘HHHHHTTTTT’ or ‘THTHTHTHTH’ provides less evidence
against H0 than ’HHHHHHHHHH’ does. The technical concept for implement-
ing this intuition consists in calculating the chance of a transformation of the
data that is a minimally sufficient statistic with respect to the parameter of
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interest ϑ, such as the number of heads or tails. Then we get the desired result
that ten heads, but not five heads vs. five tails (in whatever order) constitute
a significant finding against H0. Thus, there is no exceptionally rare chance as
such – any such chance is relative to the choice of a parameter that determines
the way in which the data are exceptional.
This line of reasoning fits well with the above example, but it introduces im-
plicit alternative hypotheses. When relativizing unexpectedness to a parameter
of interest, we are committing ourselves to a specific class of potential alternative
hypotheses – namely those hypotheses that correspond to the other parameter
values. When applying Fisher’s Disjunction, we do not judge the tenability of
H0 ‘in general’, without recourse to a specific parameter of interest or a class
of alternatives – we always examine a certain way the data could deviate from
the null. Thus, we are not testing the probability model H0 as such, but a par-
ticular aspect thereof, such as ‘why that value of ϑ rather than another one?’.
The choice of a parameter reveals a class of intended alternatives.12
This has some general morals: what makes an observation evidence against a
hypothesis is not its low probability under this hypothesis, but its low probabil-
ity compared to an alternative hypothesis. An improbable event is not evidence
against a hypothesis per se, but
“[...] what it does show is that if there is any alternative hypothesis
which will explain the occurrence of the sample with a more reason-
able probability [...] you will be very much more inclined to consider
that the original hypothesis is not true.” (William S. Gosset (“Stu-
dent”) in private communication to Egon Pearson, quoted in Royall
1997, 68.)
Thus, Fisher’s Disjunction and the inference from relatively unlikely results to
substantial evidence is caught in a dilemma: Either we run into the inconsis-
tencies described above, or the choice of the test statistic reveals implicit alter-
natives to which the hypothesis is compared. Then the falsificationist heuristics
of Fisher’s Disjunction has to be replaced by an account of contrastive test-
ing. Then, it is unclear to what extent the Fisherian framework of significance
testing can claim any advantage vis-a`-vis Neyman and Pearson’s tests of two
competing hypotheses.
The Base Rate Fallacy. Gigerenzer (1993) famously characterized the in-
ner life of a scientist who uses statistical methods by means of an analogy from
psychoanalysis: there is a Neyman-Pearsonian Super-Ego, a Fisherian Ego and
a Bayesian Id. The Neyman-Pearsonian Super-Ego preserves a couple of unintu-
itive insights, e.g. that we cannot test a theory without specifying alternatives,
that significance tests only give us the probability of data given a hypothesis,
instead of an assessment of the hypothesis’s credibility. The Bayesian Id is lo-
cated at the other end of the spectrum, incorporating the researcher’s desire for
posterior probabilities of a hypothesis, as a measure of its tenability or credi-
bility. The Ego is caught in the conflict between these extremes, and acts as
the scientist’s guide through reality. It adopts a Fisherian position where both
12There is no canonical class of alternatives: we could plausibly suspect that the coin
has an in-built mechanism that makes it come up with alternating results, and then,
‘THTHTHTHTH’ would not be an insignificant finding, but speak to a high degree against
the chance hypothesis.
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extremes are kept in balance: significance test neither give behavioral prescrip-
tions nor posterior probabilities, rather they yield “a rational and well-defined
measure of reluctance to the acceptance of the hypotheses they test” (Fisher
1956, 44).
However, the Bayesian Id sometimes breaks through. As pointed out by
Oakes (1986) and Gigerenzer (1993), most active researchers in the social sci-
ences – even those with statistical education – tend to interpret significance
levels (e.g. p = 0.01) as posterior probabilities of the null hypothesis, or at least
as overwhelming evidence against the null. Why is this inference wrong?
Assume that we want to test a certain null hypothesis against a very implau-
sible alternative, e.g. that the person under test has a very rare disease. So the
null denotes absence of that disease. Now, a highly sensitive test, that is right
about 99.9% of the time, indicates presence of the disease, yielding a very low
p-value. Many people would now we tempted to conclude that the person prob-
ably has the disease. But since that disease is rare, the posterior probability of
the null hypothesis can still be very large. In other words, evidence that speaks
to a large degree against the null is not sufficient to support a judgment against
the null – it would only do so if the null and the alternative were about equally
likely at the outset. Such a failure to recognize the dependency between the base
rate of the null hypothesis and the strength of the final evidential judgment is
called the base rate fallacy.
Although that fallacy is severe and widespread (and similar misinterpreta-
tions of significance tests abound, see Gigerenzer 2008), those fallacies might
speak more against the practice of significance testing than against significance
tests themselves. In any case, they invite to misinterpretations, especially be-
cause p-values (significance levels) are hard to related to scientifically meaningful
conclusions.13
The Replicability Fallacy. This fallacy is more subtle than the base rate
fallacy. It does not interpret p-values as posterior probabilities, but understands
a p-value of, say, 0.05 as saying that if the experiment were repeated, a result
that was at least as significant as the present observations would occur at 95%
of the time. Thus, the outcome is believed to have implications for the recur-
rence of a significant result and for the replicability of the present observations.
And replicability is, needless to say, one of the main quality brands of good
experiments.
In principle, there is nothing wrong with connecting replicability to signif-
icance testing. But a crucial premise is left out – namely that the replication
frequency holds only under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true. Since
the power of many significance tests is low, implying that nonsignificant results
often occur when the null is actually false, the kind of replicability that sig-
nificance tests ensure is much more narrow than desired (Schmidt and Hunter
1997). A solution to this problem that has gained more and more followers
in the last decades is to replace significance levels by confidence intervals that
address the issue of replicability regardless of whether the null hypothesis is
actually true.
The Jeffrey-Lindley Paradox. This problem sheds light on the impor-
tance of sample size in statistical testing, and applies to both Fisher’s and
13See Casella and Berger (1987) and Sellke and Berger (1987) for more detailed discussions
of the evidential value of p-values in different testing problems.
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Neyman and Pearson’s framework. For a large enough sample, a point null
hypothesis can be rejected at a significant level while the posterior probability
of the null approaches one (Lindley 1957). Take, for instance, a normal model
N(0, 1) where we test the value of the mean: H0 : µ = 0 against an alternative
H1 : µ = 1. Since the sampling distribution of the mean of n samples Xn ap-
proaches N(0, 1/n), any slight deviation of the mean from the null hypothesis
will suffice to make the result statistically significant. Even more, if we decide
to sample on until we get significant results against the null hypothesis, we will
finally get them (Mayo and Kruse 2001).
At the same time, the posterior of the null hypothesis also converges to
1 with increasing n, as long as the divergence remains rather small. Thus,
for large samples, significance levels do not reliably indicate whether or not a
certain effect is present, and can grossly deviate from the hypothesis’s posterior
credibility. Significance tests may tell us whether there is evidence against a
point null hypothesis, but they don’t tell us whether that effect is large enough
to be of scientific interest.
Statistical versus practical significance. Typically, the null hypothesis
typically denotes an idealized hypothesis, such as “there is no difference between
the effects of A and B”. In practice, no one believes such a hypothesis to be
literally true, rather, everyone expects that there are differences, but perhaps
just at a minute degree: “The effects of A and B are always different – in some
decimal place – for some A and B. Thus asking ‘Are the effects different?’ is
foolish.” (Tukey 1991, 100)
However, even experienced scientists often read tables in an article by looking
out for asterisks: one asterisk denotes “significant” findings (p < 0.05), two
asterisks denote “highly significant” (p < 0.01) findings. It is almost impossible
to resist the psychological drive to forget about the subtle differences between
statistical and scientific significance, and many writers exploit that fact:
“All psychologists know that statistically significant does not mean
plain-English significant, but if one reads the literature, one often
discovers that a finding reported in the Results sections studded with
asterisks becomes in the Discussion section highly significant or very
highly significant, important, big!” (Cohen 1994, 1001)
Instead, statistical significance should at best mean that evidence speaks against
our idealized hypothesis while we are still unable to give the direction of depar-
ture or the size of the observed effect (Kirk 1996). This provisional interpre-
tation is in line with Fisher’s own scepticism regarding the interpretation of
significance tests, and Keuzenkamp and Magnus’s (1995) observation that sig-
nificance testing in econometrics rarely leads to the dismissal of an economic
theory, and its subsequent replacement.
Finally, under the assumption that null hypotheses are strictly spoken wrong,
it is noteworthy that significance tests bound the probability of erroneously
rejecting the null, while putting no constraints on the probability of erroneously
accepting the null, i.e. the power of a test. Considerations of power, sample size
and effect size that are fundamental in Neyman and Pearson’s approach fall out
of the simplified Fisherian picture of significance testing. This is not to say that
these tests are worthless – for instance, in econometrics, a series of significance
tests can be very useful to detect whether a model of a certain process has
been misspecified. Significance tests look for directions in different departures
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(autocorrelation, moving average, etc.), and significant results provide us with
reasons to believe that our model has been misspecified, and make us think
harder about the right form of the model that we want to use in future research
(Mayo and Spanos 2004; Spanos 1986).
In that spirit, it should be stressed once more that Fisher considered signifi-
cance tests to be a preliminary, explorative form of statistical analysis that gives
rise to further investigations, not to final decisions on a hypothesis. But read-
ing social science journals, it is not always clear that the practicing researchers
are aware of the problem. The penultimate section briefly sketches how this
problem was addressed in the last decades.
8 Recent Trends
All the criticisms of significance testing have led many authors to conclude that
significance tests do not help to address scientifically relevant questions. Using
them in spite of their inability to address the relevant questions only invites to
misuse and confusion (Cohen 1994; Schmidt 1996). Since the problem and its
discussion was especially pronounced in experimental psychology, we focus on
the reactions in that field.
Recognizing that those criticisms were justified, the American Psychological
Association (APA) appointed a Task Force on Statistical Interference (TFSI)
whose task consisted in investigating controversial methodological issues in in-
ferential statistics, including significance testing and its alternatives (Harlow et
al. 1997; Thompson 1999a; Wilkinson et al. 1999). After long deliberation, the
Task Force came up with some recommendations that made the APA change
their publication guidelines, affecting major journals affiliated to the APA, such
as Psychological Review. The commission stated, for instance, that p-values do
not reflect the significance or magnitude of an observed effect, and “encouraged”
authors to provide information on effect size, either by means of directly report-
ing an effect size measure (e.g. Pearson’s correlation coefficient r or Cohen’s
effect size measure d), or power and sample size of the test.
However, as predicted by Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989) and observed by
a lot of empirical studies on research practice (e.g. Keselman et al. 1998), the
admonitions and encouragements of the APA publication manual proved to be
futile. First, psychologists were not trained at computing and working with ef-
fect sizes. Second, “there is only one force that can effect a change, namely the
editors of the major journals” (Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer 1989, 315). Encourage-
ment was likely to be ignored when compared to the compulsory requirements
when submitting a manuscript and abiding by formatting guidelines:
“To present an ‘encouragement’ in the context of strict absolute
[manuscript] standards [...] is to send the message ‘these myriad re-
quirements count, this encouragement doesn’t’.” (Thompson 1999b,
162)
However, the extensive methodological debate finally seems to bear fruit.
As pointed out by Vacha-Haase et al. (2000), quite some editors changed their
policy, requiring the inclusion of effect size measures, where unwillingness to
comply with that guideline had to be justified in a special note. This devel-
opment, though far from overturning and eliminating all fallacious practices,
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shows that sensitivity for the issue has increased, and raises hope for the future.
Also, Bayesian methods (and other approaches, such as Royall’s (1997) like-
lihoodism) gain increasing acceptance beyond purely technical journals. Such
inferential methods can now, to an increasing extent, be found in major psy-
chology journals as well. Finally, there is an increasing amount of journals that
address a readership that is interested in mathematical and statistical modeling
in the social sciences, as well as in methodological foundations. Although the
presentation and interpretation of statistical findings in the social sciences is still
wanting, there is some reason for optimism: the problems have been discovered
and addressed, and we are now in the phase where a change towards a more
reliable methodology is about to be effectuated. As stated by Cohen (1994),
this change is slowed down by the conservativeness of many scientists, and their
desire for automated inferential mechanisms. But such “cooking recipes” do, as
the drawbacks of significance tests teach us, not exist.
9 Summary
Let us conclude. In this contribution, we have surveyed and classified a variety
of mathematical methods that are used in the social sciences and argued that
such techniques, in spite of several methodological objections, can add extra
value to social scientific research. Then, we have focused on methodological
issues in statistics – the part of mathematics that is most frequently used in the
social sciences, in particular in the design and interpretation of experiments.
We have represented the emergence of and the rationale behind the ubiquitous
significance tests, as well as explained the pitfalls to which many researches fall
prey when using them. Finally, after comparing significance testing to rivalling
schools of statistical inference, we have discussed recent trends in the method-
ology of the social sciences and argued that there is reason for optimism, and
that awareness of methodological problems, as well as interest for mathematical
and statistical techniques is growing.
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